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NOTES
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
IN TAX LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The current American Rule' of cost allocation, which holds
litigants responsible for their own attorney fees and other litigation
expenses, has both common law and statutory exceptions. Under the
common law, courts have the power to award fees when overriding
considerations of justice so demand. First, the bad faith exception per-
mits an award of attorney fees when the losing party has willfully
disobeyed a court order, acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons.' Second, the common fund or common
benefit exception3 allows the court to award attorney fees to a party
whose legal action creates or preserves a fund of money or other
assets for the benefit of others as well as for the litigating party.
Finally, a series of statutory exceptions modify the American Rule.
1. The American Rule is founded on the belief that a litigant should not
be penalized for either the prosecution or the defense of a lawsuit. In Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714. 717 (1967), the Supreme Court
noted that the repeal of the American Rule would threaten independent advocacy since
the poor might not initiate actions to protect their rights if the additional liability
of their opponents' attorney fees loomed as a consequence of defeat.
In contrast, English courts have awarded counsel fees to successful plaintiffs
since 1278 when the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I. Ch. 1 (1275) became effective.
In England, defendants gained the right to an award of attorney fees in 1607. The
disparity between plaintiff and defendant recovery rights has persisted through rather
recent statutory exceptions to the American Rule. See infra text accompanying notes
51 and 52.
2. Particular activities or conduct serve as concrete definitions of bad faith
and as support for the right to an award of attorney fees. Other terms that have
been employed by the courts are "obdurate obstinacy," ".wantonness," "dilatory,"
"groundless," "oppressive," and the like.
See generally 31 A.L.R. FED. 833 (1977). See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
3. Absent a statutory prohibition, federal courts may award attorney fees
from a fund to a party. The party must have a common, interest with other persons
and must have maintained, at his own expense and for the common benefit of those
persons, a suit which resulted in the creation or preservation of a fund in which all
of those having the common interest share. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527,
531 (1962).
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Two statutes which have affected tax litigants are representative
of legislation which has been enacted at least in part to offset litiga-
tion expenses' which often impede a citizen from bringing suit against
the government on a valid claim.> The Equal Access to Justice Act
of 19806 (EAJA) amended' 28 U.S.C. §2412(a) to provide explicitly that
costs, but not attorney fees, could be awarded against the United
States. EAJA reiterated the American Rule and also provided an
exception to it.8 The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 19829
(TEFRA) removes tax litigants from coverage by EAJA and allocates
the burden of proof to the taxpayer. Both EAJA and TEFRA follow
4. The word "expenses" will be used throughout this note to refer to any
expenditures made by a litigant. "Fees" refers to the amount paid to an attorney.
and "costs" encompasses all other litigation expenditures.
5. The extensive resources and personnel of government agencies render
the decisions of these bodies almost impervious to challenge by the common citizen
unless that individual is benefited by statutory provisions which help to ensure each
person a day in court for the adjudication of appropriate complaints. Equal Access
to Justice Act, S 201, 5 U.S.C. S 504 note.
6. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub.L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (codified
in various United States Code sections of different titles including 5 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.,
and 48 U.S.C.).
7. Throughout this note EAJA will be discussed in the past tense. Even
though the statute is still viable, it no longer applies to tax litigation.
8. The pertinent provision reads:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs,
as enumerated in Section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and
expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any
civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or
official of the United States or any agency or official of the United States
acting in his official capacity, in any court having jurisdiction of such action.
28 U.S.C. §2412(a) (Supp. 1983).
The subsequent paragraph of the same section creates an immediate statutory
exception with the following words:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable
fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be
awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil
action brought by or against the United States or any agency and any
official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any
court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable
for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would
be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which
specifically provides for such an award.
28 U.S.C. §2412(b) (Supp. 1983).
Therefore, whereas costs may be awarded in any litigation, fees may be
awarded only pursuant to similar statutory language.
9. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-248,
(codified at 26 U.S.C. S 7430 (Supp. 1983)) (relating to the recovery of attorney fees).
[Vol. 19
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the congressional trend toward authorized recovery of attorney fees
in areas of specific and compelling public interest."
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, a section
of which is known as the Allen Amendment, was the first statute
providing for the recovery of attorney fees in tax litigation." However,
the vague language of the amendment" and the confusion surround-
ing its procedural application led to such strict judicial interpretation
that the statute's effect on the recovery of attorney fees in tax litiga-
tion was negligible.
10. Among the areas of specific and compelling public interest are civil rights.
Title II and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S S 2000 a-3(b) and
2000 e-5(k) (1976) authorize the court to allow a prevailing party, other than the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission or the United States, reasonable attorney fees
as part of the costs in an action under the equal employment opportunities and the
public accommodations parts of the Act. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §3612(c) (1975), provides that the court may grant reasonable attorney fees
to a prevailing plaintiff who in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume
said attorney fees.
The court may grant reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs
reasonably incurred under Title III of the Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C.
S 2520(c) (1976). The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552(a}(4)(E) (1976) states
that when a litigant has substantially prevailed, the court may assess against the United
States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. The
Voting Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. S 1973/(e) (1976), encourages private litigants
to act as private attorneys general through the provision of attorney fee awards.
The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. S S 2059(e)(4), 2060, 2072(a), and
2073 (1976), defines a reasonable attorney fee as one based upon (1) the actual time
expended by an attorney in providing advice and other legal services in connection
with representing a person in an action brought under this Act, (2) such reasonable
expenses as may be incurred by the attorney in the provision of such services, and
(3) a computation at the prevailing rate for provision of similar services with respect
to actions brought in the court which is awarding the fee.
11. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. S 1988
(1976) provided in pertinent part, before it was amended by the Equal Access to Justice
Act:
[In] any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States
to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States
Internal Revenue Code of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States reasonable attorney fees as a part of the costs.
This statute, of course, pre-dated and is largely unrelated to EAJA.
12. See supra note 11. See also Note, Attorney's Fees In Tax Litigation, 45
BROOKLYN L. REV. 53, 65-79 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Attorney's Fees]. Courts have
held that the Allen Amendment applied only to an extremely limited number of cases
of administrative harassment, thus virtually negating the statute's applicability. See
infra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
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EAJA preserved the concept that taxpayers should have an
opportunity to recover attorney fees. The Act provided in pertinent
part that litigants in any civil action or agency adjudication, including,
at that time, taxpayers who could show that the government lacked
a reasonable basis for its action, might recover attorney fees in Arti-
cle III courts."3 EAJA offered taxpayers a better chance of recover-
ing attorney fees than had previously been available." However, the
opportunity for recovery under this Act was still denied to litigants
in the Tax Court 5 the only court where one may settle a tax dispute
without first paying the tax.' Although no longer applicable to any
tax litigation, EAJA is still a viable statute and remains in effect;
however, on September 30, 1984, its costs and fees section expired
pursuant to a sunset provision."
In 1982 Congress enacted TEFRA. One section of this current
statute provides for the recovery of attorney fees in all tax litigation.'
This section simultaneously removes tax litigation from the aegis of
13. The Constitution states that:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behavior and shall at stated times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, S 1. The significance of EAJA's applicability in only Article III courts
is that the Tax Court is excluded; therefore, much tax litigation was also excluded.
See infra note 15.
14. EAJA's language was more specific than that of the Allen Amendment.
Therefore, litigants were no longer constrained by the judicially inferred standard
of administrative harassment. Instead of requiring the taxpayer to prove harassment.
EAJA provided that the government show substantial justification for its actions. See
infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
15. Since the Tax Court is not an Article III court, recovery of attorney fees
was not allowed there under EAJA. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 gave the Tax Court
the status of a legislative court under Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the Constitu-
tion which provides that one power of Congress is, "To constitute Tribunals inferior
to the Supreme Court." I.R.C. S 7441 states, "There is hereby established under Arti-
cle I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the
United States Tax Court." The Tax Court has the power to adjudicate tax deficien-
cies, but Tax Court judges do not have life tenure as do judges of an Article III court.
Tax Court judges are appointed for a fifteen year term and must retire at age seven-
ty. For a detailed history of the Tax Court, see H. DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX
COURT (1979).
16. 9 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 5801.17 states, "The Tax Court was created
primarily to afford a taxpayer an opportunity to be heard before being compelled to
pay an income, gift, or estate tax."
17. 28 U.S.C. S 2412 (1976).
18. TEFRA, 26 U.S.C. S 7430 (Supp. 1983).
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EAJA and lifts the bar to recovery of attorney fees for litigation in
Tax Court.'"
This note explores the development of legislation permitting the
recovery of attorney fees in tax litigation. Beginning with an examina-
tion of the judicial interpretation of the Allen Amendment, the note
continues with a chronological analysis of EAJA and TEFRA. It con-
cludes with a consideration of currently proposed legislation which
would repeal the section of TEFRA that applies to tax litigation and
establish EAJA as a permanent statute.
The comparison of these four enactments reveals differences in
the courts to which the statutes apply, the standards of recovery,
and the amounts recoverable. For taxpayers attempting to recover
fees, a difference of primary importance is the allocation of the burden
of proof to the government under EAJA 0 and to the taxpayer under
TEFRA.2 ' The most similar features of the two currently operative
statutes, EAJA and TEFRA, are their sunset provisions which indicate
that the statutes will expire on September 30, 1984, and December
31, 1985, respectively.'
Before September 30, 1984, Congress may choose from among
several alternatives: allow the statutes to expire, extend the statutes
as currently written, modify both statutes, or combine the first three
options in some way. A congressional decision to bring tax cases back
within the scope of EAJA will abolish the inequity which currently
exists regarding burden of proof. However, in order for EAJA to apply
to all tax litigation, the statutory language must be altered so as to
apply to Tax Court and all federal courts. An equitable solution is
for Congress to adopt one standard for all litigants who attempt to
recover attorney fees from the government. The most prudent Con-
gressional action would be to allow the fee recovery section of TEFRA
to expire and to extend EAJA, after including all tax litigation within
its scope through the use of more specific and forceful language than
that which exists in Senate Bill 919.2
II. THE ALLEN AMENDMENT
The need for precise statutory language is apparent at each step
in the historical development of attorney fee award provisions. The
effect of vague language upon judicial interpretation is nowhere more
19. See infra notes 177-199 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 185-192 and accompanying text.
22. 28 U.S.C. S 2412 and 26 US.C. S 7430 (Supp. 1983).
23. S. 919, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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apparent than in cases based upon the Allen Amendment. Courts con-
sidering this statute construed such apparently straightforward, yet
inherently vague, phrases as "civil action or proceeding 2 4 and "by
or on behalf of the United States"' to mean that the statute was
inapplicable to most tax litigation. From its inception, the Allen
Amendment was enmeshed in both political and judicial controversy
because its purpose and scope were indefinite.26
The Allen Amendment was enacted in 1976, during a decade
when an award of attorney fees was a significant part of a remedy
that a court could fashion in order to carry out congressional policy
embodied in civil rights and environmental laws.' Since private litiga-
tion was frequently the major means of securing broad compliance
with the law, courts encouraged the concept of private attorneys
general.' Because private parties were largely unable to bear the cost
of public interest litigation" courts awarded attorney fees to prevail-
ing private attorneys general. From the outset this practice was con-
troversial because of the strong tradition of the American Rule.
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court struck down
nonlegislative designations of private attorneys general in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 0 After the pivotal Alyeska
decision, courts no longer award attorney fees to a party unless that
individual falls within either a common law or statutory exception
to the American Rule." The Allen Amendment was a part of the con-
gressional reaction to the restrictions enunciated in Alyeska and
became the first statute providing for the recovery of attorney fees
in tax litigation.
24. See supra notes 11 and 12 and see infra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
25. Id.
26. See infra notes 35 and 66 and accompanying text.
27. Note, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 33 MD. L. REv. 379 (1973).
28. Attorney fees incurred in civil rights actions may be awarded under the
private attorney general theory where private plaintiffs have aided in effectuating
important congressional and public policies. See, e.g. Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880
(7th Cir. 1973).
29. See, eg., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971)
which noted that a developer's refusal to sell lots to blacks and to whites on the same
terms entitled black plaintiff, acting as a private attorney general, to recover attorney
fees.
30. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). The Court declared that designations of private at-
torneys general conflicted with the traditional presumption against attorney fees "deeply
rooted in our history and in congressional policy." Id. at 271. For a thorough discus-
sion of Alyeska, see Note, Attorney's Fees, supra note 12, at 57-59.
31. See supra note 1.
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The primary focus of the congressional reaction to Alyeska was
not tax, but civil rights legislation. In 1975, Senator John Tunney 2
introduced a bill which would have authorized an award of attorney
fees for specified civil rights actions." As initially introduced, the bill
which became the Civl Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
provided for the recovery of attorney fees only in cases in which the
enforcement of civil rights depended heavily upon private individuals
initiating the litigation.' Twice the late Senator James B. Allen tried
to extend the civil rights bill to tax litigation." Senator Allen's initial
and unsuccessful amendment focused on alleviating the effects of
frivolous or vexatious administrative harassment.1 Senator Allen then
offered an amendment, later passed by both the Senate and the House,
to include the statutes under which reasonable attorney fees could
be awarded to the prevailing party.' By the time the Allen Amend-
ment appeared in its final form, the language contained absolutely
32. Senator Tunney is a Democrat from California.
33. The bill, S. 2278, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 26806 (1975)
provided:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of Sections 1977. 1978,
1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, or title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as a part of
the costs.
34. 122 CONG. REC. 33313 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Tunney, sponsor of S. 2278).
35. Senator James B. Allen, a Democrat from Alabama, introduced the first
amendment, No. 472 [amending S. 2278, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. S. 16428
(1976)], which provided for an award of reasonable attorney fees in the court's discre-
tion "where the suit is brought by the IRS against any person and said suit is found
in such action to be without merit or frivolous." This amendment was rejected. 122
CONG. REC. S. 16430 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
Senator Allen's second amendment, No. 2419 [amending S. 2278, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S. 17049 (1976)] authorized courts to allow reasonable attorney
fees as part of the costs in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United
States of America, either to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of the United
States Internal Revenue Code. Because Senator Allen opposed the central provisions
of the civil rights legislation, the possibility exists that he introduced the tax aspect
of the attorney fee bill in order to retard or defeat the passage of the bill. Whatever
the senator's motivation may have been, both the Senate and the House passed the
amended version of the attorney fees bill. 122 CONG. REC. S. 517050 and H. 17053 (1976).
See Note, Attorney's Fees, supra note 11, for a thorough discussion of the flurry of
legislative activity regarding both tax and civil rights issues in 1975-1976.
36. The unsuccessful amendment, No. 472 [amending S. 2278, 94th Cong. 2d
Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S. 16428 (1976)], provided for an award of reasonable attorney fees
in the court's discretion "where suit is brought by the IRS against any person asser-
ting the existence of tax liability to the Government on the part of such person and
said suit is found in such action to be without merit or frivolous. 122 CONG. REC. S.
16430 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
37. See supra note 10 for a discussion of other statutes which provide for
19841
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no reference to harassment. 8
Nevertheless, courts which looked to the legislative history of
the amendment in applying it to tax litigation were inconsistent in
their interpretations.' Some courts relied on the full legislative history
and thus interpreted the simply-worded final amendment to address
the problem of administrative harassment." Other courts read the
amendment as an attempt to provide all tax litigants equal access
to the courts." Two cases, United States v. Garrison42 and Patzkowski
v. United States,43 exemplify the inconsistency of judicial interpreta-
tions of the amendment.
In Garrison, the taxpayer applied for an award of attorney fees,
asserting that the company had been the subject of vexatious treat-
ment by the IRS." In response to the taxpayer's contention, the
district court apparently focused on the legislative history of Senator
Allen's rejected amendment, the one which dealt with administrative
harassment." The court held that it could award attorney fees where
the taxpayer had been subjected to vexatious or harassing treatment.
Additionally, the court found that proof of the common law bad faith
exception to the American Rule was not necessary in order to invoke
the statute." In Garrison, the court found harassment and assessed
$1,000 against the United States."
Ignoring the harassment standard, the trial court in Patzkowski
was convinced that the legislative history of the Act required proof
of bad faith. On that basis the court rejected the taxpayer's request
for an award of attorney fees."' The appellate court, however, reversed
an award of attorney fees and note 11 for the pertinent language of the Allen
Amendment.
38. See supra note 11.
39. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
41. See Note, Attorney's Fees, supra note 12, at 64-66.
42. 77-2 U.S.T.C. 9705 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
43. 576 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1978).
44. The petitioner IRS issued a summons to the taxpayer for the production
of the taxpayer's books and records. Garrison appeared with counsel before the IRS
agent and declined to produce the records summoned because the company had previous-
ly made all such records available in connection with an audit of Garrison Construc-
tion Company, Inc.'s income tax return for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976. The
IRS petitioned the court to enforce the summons, but the taxpayer, relying on Sec-
tion 7605(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, refused to comply. Garrison, at 9705.
45. See supra note 35.
46 Garrison at 19705. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the American Rule.
47. Garrison at 9705.
48. Patzkowski, 576 F.2d at 139.
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and remanded the case because the district court had limited its
analysis to the sole issue of governmental bad faith."9 The appellate
court noted, "The Act itself contains utterly no reference to bad faith
on the part of the Government as a prerequisite for an award of
attorney's fees to a prevailing taxpayer-defendant."" The court went
on to analyze carefully the legislative history of the Act. In this
analysis the court raised yet another area of confusion in regard to
the Allen Amendment. In Patzkowski, the appellate court concluded
that Congress had recognized that the standards to be applied in
awards of fees to defendants were different from standards applicable
to plaintiffs." This decision stated that courts applying the Allen
Amendment must consider requests by prevailing defendants pursuant
to standards developed in the area of civil rights litigation." The ap-
pellate court in Patzkowski concluded that Congress intended to give
prevailing defendants in tax litigation as well as in civil rights litiga-
tion substantial relief through awards of attorney fees. The court
specified that prevailing defendants could receive an award in two
situations: first, in cases in which the government attempted to in-
timidate or overreach the taxpayer without cause or acted in a vex-
atious or harassing manner, and, second, in cases in which the govern-
ment proceeded in bad faith.Y
Significantly, the appellate court which considered Patzkowski
noted that proof of the government's subjective bad faith, although
49. Id. at 135. The taxpayer in Patzkowski appealed from a denial of attorney
fees in an action which resulted from his payment of a portion of an IRS penalty
assessment. After IRS denied his claim for a refund, Patzkowski brought a refund
suit. In this suit the government counterclaimed for the balance and also filed a third
party complaint seeking to recover the same penalty assessment from another individual.
A jury found the third party liable. The court entered judgment accordingly, granting
Patzkowski his refund and dismissing the IRS counterclaim. Id.
50. Id. at 137.
51. Id.
52. See generally Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). which held that the court should not award attorney
fees to the defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, unless the plain-
tiff's action was unreasonable or without foundation. The Court also gave its general
approval to the criteria applied in United States Steel Corporation v. United States,
519 F.2d 359, 363 (3rd Cir. 1975), where fees were denied because the plaintiffs action
had not been "unfounded, meritless, frivolous, or vexatiously brought." The Court noted
that "meritless" is to be understood to mean groundless or without foundation, rather
than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his case. Additionally, the court stated
that the term "vexatious" in no way implies that the plaintiff's subjective bad faith
is a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him.
53. Patzkowski, 576 F.2d at 139.
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a viable argument, was not an absolute requirement for the recovery
of attorney fees." Despite the appellate court ruling on the optional
nature of the bad faith standard, the concept of administrative harass-
ment thereafter disappeared from courts' analyses of the Allen Amend-
ment and was replaced exclusively by the bad faith standard. In 1979
the Supreme Court based an award of $25,000 on its finding that the
IRS had acted in bad faith when it misapplied payments made by
the taxpayer." Shortly thereafter in a case typical of district court
decisions which followed, a lower court determined that an IRS
counterclaim filed solely to intimidate an employee into testifying
against her employer was an example of governmental bad faith." The
case contained no discussion of administrative harassment, reflecting
the trend to forego that standard in favor of bad faith.
Also relying on the bad faith standard, in 1980, the Fifth Circuit
so narrowly construed the Allen Amendment that its subsequent
benefit to taxpayers was negligible."7 In Key Buick Co. v.
54. Id.
55. According to In re Slodov, 79-1 U.S.T.C. 9215 (1979), attorney fees were
awarded to a taxpayer, Slodov, who assumed control of three corporations and was
subsequently assessed a one hundred percent (100%) penalty for failing to withhold
employee wages and FICA taxes which were unpaid and dissipated by the prior cor-
poration managers. After assuming control of the three corporations, Slodov had entered
into an agreement with the IRS under which his payments would be applied to an
outstanding trust fund liability. Despite the agreement, the IRS applied the payments
to current non-trust fund obligations and sued Slodov for the trust fund liability.
56. In Bryant v. United States, 79-2 U.S.T.C. 9660 (E.D.Pa. 1977), the court
determined that the government had instituted the suit solely for the purpose of secur-
ing Bryant's testimony against her employer, John Borden and Bros., Inc., which had
a long history of making untimely payments of withholding taxes to the IRS.
57. In Jones v. United States, 613 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1980), 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9291,
the appellate court established guidelines which courts should follow in awarding fees
under the Allen Amendment. The appellate court reversed a district court's denial
of attorney fees to the taxpayer and characterized the government's action as "the
epitome of a frivolous and unreasonable lawsuit." Id. at 1312. The appellate court award-
ed recovery of attorney fees to a logging contractor who was assessed $28.55 and
$25.19 respectively for federal unemployment and Social Security (FICA) taxes for
1973 and 1974. The IRS concluded that wages paid to an employee were subject to
those withholding taxes even though the IRS had proof in its own files that the defen-
dant did not owe the taxes. After finding that the government's claim was meritless,
the appellate court remanded the case to the district court for the award of attorney
fees for both the trial and appellate level, consistent with the guidelines established
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974).
See infra note 212. Thus, other than suggesting specific guidelines for determining
the amount of attorney fees which can reasonably be recovered, Jones did not significant-
ly alter prior judicial interpretation of the Allen Amendment. However, Key Buick,
613 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980), decided by the same court on the same day, spelled
the end of the statute's usefulness.
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Commissioner, the court reached an interpretation of the procedural
requirements of the Allen Amendment which left the statute
inapplicable to most taxpayers. The court used the doctrine of ejusdem
generis9 to interpret the words "civil action or proceeding" in the
Allen Amendment.' Using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 261 to
interpret "civil action," the court cautioned that"proceeding" must not
be expansively interpreted. The court found that "civil action or pro-
ceeding" meant litigation only and that the term did not include
administrative proceedings." After reviewing the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act, the court concluded that Congress may not
have been aware that the Allen Amendment would have so little
impact or practical implication.0 This court held that in order for an
award of attorney fees to be appropriate under the Allen Amendment,
the government must be the initiating or moving party of the lawsuit.$
The court reasoned that since the vast majority of tax litigation came
either from Tax Court suits, which must be filed by a taxpayer, his
transferee or his fiduciary, or from refund suits filed by taxpayers
in district courts, most tax litigation was not encompassed by the Allen
Amendment.
Under a literal interpretation of the Allen Amendment, a tax-
payer became eligible for an award of attorney fees by satisfying three
procedural requirements."' First, the taxpayer was required to be the
prevailing party." Second, the suit had to be a civil action or
proceeding. Third, the action had to have been brought by or on
58. 13 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. The ejusdem generis doctrine states that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same general kind of class as those specifically
mentioned. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed. 1979).
60. See supra note 11.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 2 states, "There shall be one form of action to be known as
'civil action."'
62. Key Buick, 613 F.2d at 1308. The court interpreted the language of the
Allen Amendment to exclude administrative proceedings. The statute contained no
reference to administrative proceedings. See supra. note 11.
63. Id. at 1308-09.
64. Included among suits which the IRS typically initiates are Notices of
Definciency and audits. The court interpreted "by or on behalf of the United States"
to mean that the government had to initiate the action. See supra note 11.
65. Note, The Fifth Circuit Curtails IRS Taxing Techniques, 26 Loy. L. REV.
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behalf of the United States of America.8 At the time courts were
applying the Allen Amendment to tax litigation, the term "prevailing
party" was considered self explanatory. 9 In regard to the second pro-
cedural requirement, Key Buick held that a civil action or proceeding
meant only litigation."' Therefore, after Key Buick a taxpayer could
not recover attorney fees in administrative proceedings before the
IRS.7 The impact of this decision is clear. After Key Buick, courts
would no longer award attorney fees to successful plaintiffs in tax
litigation based upon the Allen Amendment. Only in administrative
procedures is the IRS the moving party. Key Buick squarely holds
that fee awards could not be made either in administrative proceedings
or in court actions where the government was not the moving party. 2
Therefore, tax litigants simply could not apply the Allen Amendment.
If Congress wished to extend the opportunity for recovery of attorney
fees to tax litigants, new legislation was necessary.
68. Id.
69. EAJA and TEFRA were conceived with more precise definitions of prevail-
ing party. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text for EAJA interpretation and
notes 180-184 and accompanying text for TEFRA definition of the term "prevailing
party."
70. Key Buick, 613 F.2d at 1309.
71. After commentators suggested the limited applicability of the Act, Senator
Allen commented on this concern:
There is only one kind of tax disupte regardless of who is named plaintiff
or a named defendant, or who is an appellant or an appellee, or who is
an auditor or an auditee. A tax dispute is inherently a taxpayer asser-
ting that he is not liable for a tax and the Government insisting that
he is. The reasons of public policy which would make proper a discre-
tionary award of fees are thus present or not present in a given tax con-
troversy regardless of the formal position of the parties.
123 CONG. REC. 5732 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1977).
Senator Allen remarked that he had intended the word "proceeding" to apply
to administrative proceedings and audits. Of course, the Senator's remarks after the
passage of the amendment could do nothing to alter actual legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act. That the statutory language did prevent the recovery of attorney
fees is reflected in the decision in a taxpayer's suit for refund in Richman v. United
States, 477 F. Supp. 929, 933-934 (N.D. I1. 1978). In dicta, the court noted:
We regret that the language of the Act is not susceptible of the inter-
pretation Senator Allen says he intended. In the instant case, we would
be happy to award plaintiff attorney's fees if there were any basis for
doing so ... Unfortunately, there is no way for us to do so even though
we agree with plaintiffs counsel that the statutory language compels an
illogical, even ridiculous, result. The correction, however, rests with the
Congress, not the courts.
72. Key Buick, 613 F.2d at 1308.
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III. THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
A. Introduction
Within the same year that Key Buick was decided, Congress
enacted EAJA, which repealed the Allen Amendment to the Civil
Rights Act by deleting reference to the IRS. Prior to the enactment
of EAJA, courts had narrowly construed the Allen Amendment by
consistently interpreting it to require that the taxpayer be the prevail-
ing defendant. ' Additionally, in applying the Allen Amendment, courts
had awarded fees only in those cases in which the government posi-
tion or behavior was frivolous" harassing" vexatious" unreasonable 8
or instituted in bad faith. 9 As a consequence of the narrow judicial
construction and the application of the bad faith standard, the Allen
Amendment was of little use to tax litigants. To overcome such
stringent requirements for recovery of attorney fees, the drafters of
EAJA not only specified that recovery was available to a prevailing
party other than the United States but also allocated the burden of
proof to the government to establish that its action was substantially
justified.0
Congress recognized that prior to EAJA, the American Rule had
discouraged and deterred litigation, particularly in suits against the
government.8 The costs of securing vindication of rights and the
inability to recover attorney fees often precluded resort to the
73. 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1976) provided, "in any action or proceeding to enforce
a provision of Sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of Title 42, Title IX of Public
Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States
of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of a provision of the United States Inter-
nal Revenue Code, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (emphasis supplied
to the portion of the section which ultimately led to the removal of that portion). See
supra note 11.
74. The Allen Amendment also applied to a taxpayer subject to an IRS
counterclaim. For an extensive discussion of court interpretation of the Allen Amend-
ment, see Note, Attorney's Fees, supra note 12 at 66-70.






80. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1983).
81. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. S 202 (a)-(c) (Supp. 1983) states:
(a) The congress finds that certain individuals, partnerships, corporations,
and labor and other organizations may be deterred from seeking review
of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental actions because of
the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights in civil
1984]
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adjudicatory process.2 For example, if the cost of litigating an IRS
order exceeded the amount involved, the taxpayer had neither a
realistic choice nor an effective remedy. The only economically viable
alternative was to comply with the IRS order whether or not it
appeared substantially justified. Prior to EAJA in such cases it was
more practical for the taxpayer to endure an injustice than to con-
test it.8" Both the designation of prevailing party and the allocation
of the burden of proof were contained within EAJA's general statutory
exception to the American Rule."
B. The Emerging Concept of Prevailing Party
EAJA does not limit the recovery of attorney fees to prevailing
defendants only. Rejecting the dual standards which developed under
the Allen Amendment, Congress provided that all prevailing litigants
actions and in administrative proceedings. (b) The Congress further finds
that because of the greater resources and expertise of the United States
the standard for an award of fees against the United States should be
different from the standard governing an award against a private litigant,
in certain situations. (c) It is the purpose of this title
(1) to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or
defending against, governmental action by providing in
specified situations an award of attorney fees, expert witness
fees, and other costs against the United States; and (2) to
insure the applicability in actions by or against the United
States of the common law and statutory exceptions to the
"American rule" respecting the award of attorney fees.
82. House Judiciary Committee, H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4984, 4988 (hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 96-1418).
83. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, 4989.
84. See supra note 1 for a discussion of the American Rule. The general
statutory exception in EAJA provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award
to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other ex-
penses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), in-
curred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in
tort) brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdic-
tion of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.
Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2412 (d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1983).
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against the government could recover." However, Congress did not
define the phrase "prevailing party." By not specifically defining
"prevailing party," Congress intended the interpretation of the term
to be consistent with the definition as it had evolved under existing
statutes.' As the law evolved through judicial interpretation, the term
"prevailing party" was not limited to a litigant who emerged victorious
after entry of final judgment following a full trial on the merits. For
example, one who obtained a favorable settlement was considered
prevailing' as was a party who had successfully sought a voluntary
dismissal of a groundless complaint.' Further, a litigant need not have
prevailed on all issues in order to be determined the prevailing party."
The legislative history of EAJA specified that a party could receive
a fee award in a civil action prior to the losing party's completing
its final appeal." A litigant who prevailed on an interim order which
was central to the case could also qualify as the prevailing party9
85. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4984, 4989.
86. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4990 discussed the development of judicial
interpretation of the term "prevailing party." See supra note 10 for a discussion of
other statutes which provide for an award of attorney fees.
87. Foster v. Boorstin, 561 F.2d 340, 341-342 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (a library employee
who was granted a requested promotion after commencement of court action under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but prior to judgment in the case was entitled to an
award of attorney fees as the prevailing party). See also Maher v. Gagne, 100 S.Ct.
2570 (1980).
88. Corcoran v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 121 F.2d 575, 576 (9th
Cir. 1941) When a defendant in an action for infringement of copyright has been put
to the expense of making an appearance and obtaining an order for the clarification
of the complaint, and then the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses without amending his
pleading, the defendant is the prevailing party within the spirit and intent of the
Copyright Act. The defendant is the prevailing party under these circumstances even
though she may at the whim of the plaintiff be sued again on the same cause of ac-
tion. Id.
89. Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 722 (1974)
(the language of the Emergency School Act, which in school desegregation cases allows
the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is not to be read to the effect
that a fee award must be made simultaneously with the entry of a desegregation order,
since many final orders may be issued in the course of such litigation. To delay a
fee award until the entire litigation is concluded would work a substantial hardship
on the plaintiffs and their counsel.) See also Hensley v. Eckerhart 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983).
90. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4990.
91. Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (the prevail-
ing party is one who successfully prosecutes an action or defends against it and prevails
on the main issue, even if not to the extent of his original contention. To be the prevail-
ing party does not depend upon the degree of success at different stages of the suit,
but whether, at the end of the suit, the party who made the claim has maintained it.)
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as could a victor subject to an interlocutory appeal on an issue that
was significant and sufficiently independent to be considered a
separate part of the case.2 Of the various definitions of "prevailing
party" perhaps the most significant to tax litigants while EAJA
applied to tax cases was the determination that a taxpayer who
received a favorable settlement as well as a taxpayer who did not
prevail on all of the issues could be the prevailing party.93 Likewise,
a taxpayer who had not exhausted all IRS administrative remedies
could still prevail."
Thus, taxpayers could use the various definitions of the term
"prevailing party" that had developed through court interpretation
of earlier statutes. Using EAJA as the vehicle to recover attorney
fees, a litigant who qualified as the prevailing party under any defini-
tion of the term, could then choose either the bad faith or the general
statutory exception to the American Rule in applying for recovery.
C. Standards of Recovery: The General Statutory
Exception Contrasted with the Bad Faith Exception
Under EAJA's statutory exception to the American Rule tax
litigants in the appropriate courts who prevailed against the United
States were entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs unless
the government was substantially justified in its action or unless
special circumstances prevailed which would have made such an award
unjust" The legislative history of EAJA points out that this stan-
dard balances the constitutional obligation of the executive branch
to ensure that the laws "are faithfully executed against the public
interest in encouraging parties to vindicate their rights."'' Thus, EAJA
9Z. Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974) (an
interlocutory appeal is sufficiently significant and discrete to be treated as a separate
unit. Therefore, the fact that Xerox prevailed on appeal qualified it as the prevailing
party.)
93. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4990. This interpretation allowed taxpayers to
recover expenses incurred in out-of-court settlements. Allowing such awards helps to
discourage litigation, a factor important in Tax Court, where a backlog of cases is
a significant problem.
94. In contrast to TEFRA, which specifically requires the exhaustion of
administrative remedies precedent to the recovery of attorney fees in 26 U.S.C. S
7430(b}2), EAJA contained no similar language. The policy in TEFRA may actually
encourage litigation because only if a taxpayer files suit may he hope to recover at-
torney fees.
95. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
96. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4989.
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enabled taxpayers with limited financial resources to challenge IRS
decisions in court and to recover expenses if, in fact, the IRS position
lacked substantial justification.
The EAJA test of the substantial justification of a government
action was one of reasonableness. Under EAJA's statutory exception,
the government carried the burden of proof to show that its action
was reasonable." This allocation reflected Congress' belief that, as
between the government and the taxpayer, the government, which
had control of the evidence, could more easily prove the reasonableness
of its action." Of course, in those situations in which the government
showed that its case was reasonable both in law and in fact, the tax-
payer received no award. EAJA was never intended to allow the
recovery of fees for every action brought against the government
regardless of the government's position."
The test of reasonableness under EAJA reflected a change from
the standards under the Allen Amendment. Dual standards had
developed under the Allen Amendment and other Civil Rights Acts
because the courts had held that prevailing plaintiffs could ordinarily
recover attorney fees unless special circumstances rendered an award
unjust."0 Courts had also decided that prevailing defendants could
recover attorney fees only after a finding that the plaintiff's action
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."' 1 Legislators
drafted the test under EAJA to include both prevailing plaintiffs and
prevailing defendants in general litigation against the government. 2
In order to preclude similar erroneous interpretations, Congress replac-
ed the vague language of the Allen Amendment with detailed specifica-
tions in EAJA. 3
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 4990
100. For example, Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968),
pointed out that if Congress' objective had been to authorize the assessment of at-
torney fees against defendants who make completely groundless contentions for pur-
poses of delay, no new statutory provision would have been necessary, for the bad
faith exception would have applied. Thus, Congress purposefully shifted the burden
of proof in the statutory exception to the American Rule in EAJA.
101. See e.g. Christianburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421.
102. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4989.
103. Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. S 504 provides:
(a)(1) An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to
a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses
incurred by that Party in connection with that proceeding, unless the
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In contrast to the lack of legislative history to assist courts in
their interpretation of the Allen Amendment, the legislative history
of EAJA specifies certain procedural situations which should warn
the court that the government action was not substantially justified.
The drafters explained that cases in which there was a judgment on
the pleadings, a directed verdict, or a dismissal of a prior suit on
the same claim illustrated unreasonable government action as
anticipated by the drafters."4 However, Congress noted that the
reasonableness standard should not be interpreted to raise the
presumption that the government lacked substantial justification in
every case which it lost."'5 Furthermore, in tax cases the government
was not required to prove that its decision to litigate was founded
upon the substantial probability of prevailing against a taxpayer.'6
Finally, the clause "where special circumstances would make an award
unjust" was written as a Congressional "safety valve."'07 The general
language allowed the government to advance in good faith novel but
credible extensions and interpretations of the law which could have
promoted vigorous enforcement efforts.' Of course, any novel
approach still had to be substantially justified.
Most tax litigants who sought an award of attorney fees under
EAJA alleged that the government's action was not substantially
justified. Typical of such suits is United States v. Pomp."'9 The court
found that the IRS was not justified in attempting to collect from
adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency
as a party to the proceeding was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.(2) A party seeking an award of fees
and other expenses shall, within thirty days of a final disposition in the
adversary adjudication, submit to the agency an application which shows
that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
under this section, and the amount sought, including an itemized state-
ment from any attorney, agent, or expert witness representing or appear-
ing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate
at which fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall also
allege that the position of the agency was not substantially justified.
104. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4990.
105. Id. at 4990.
106. Id.
107. See supra note 81. See also H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4990.
108. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4990.
109. 49 A.F.T.R. 2d 82-467 (M.D. Fla. 1982). The IRS had attempted to collect
a 100% penalty of $57,071.79 on May 22, 1981. Pomp was able to prove that three
years earlier the Appeals Division had found him not liable for the tax. The IRS volun-
tarily dismissed the claim, and Pomp recovered $5,175.50 in attorney fees.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [1984], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/7
ATTORNEY FEES
Pomp a penalty which had been abated by the Appeals Division before
the collection suit was begun."* Because the IRS could not go for-
ward with evidence to establish substantial justification for its action
against Pomp, the taxpayer recovered attorney fees."' Not only in
collection suits such as Pomp but also in refund suits, taxpayers
recovered fee awards against the IRS under EAJA. A district court
awarded both a refund and attorney fees to a taxpayer after the IRS
refused to refund money which it admittedly owed."2 In this decision,
the court interpreted the scope of EAJA by finding that the IRS
posture not only during litigation but also in pre-trial actions must
be substantially justified."'
In a tax assessment action a different district court again applied
the reasonableness standard and held that the IRS was unreasonable
in filing a case after the statute of limitation had elapsed."' Therefore,
the court awarded the taxpayer attorney fees under EAJA."5 Several
other cases follow the same test of reasonableness."'
Predictably, not all applications for awards under EAJA were
successful, often because the court found that the IRS took substan-
tially justified action. In explaining its rejection of one such request,
a Missouri district court acknowledged that substantial justification
was a part of the reasonableness test but denied that an award of
fees was justified simply because the government lost the case or
even because the decision to litigate was not based on a substantial
probability of prevailing."7 In slightly different language, another court
110. Id-
111. Id.
112. Constantino v. United States, 50 A.F.T.R. 2d 182-5025 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The
taxpayer filed a refund suit to recover $1,283.00 which the IRS had repeatedly refus-
ed to pay.
113. The court held that the IRS was unreasonable in not acting in response
to its agreement to pay Constantino's claim for overpaid taxes. Id. at 182-5025.
114. United States v. Grabschied, No. 81 C 7174, slip op. (ND. IMl. 1982) (available
September 1. 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed libary, tax file).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 549 F. Supp. 831, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(wording of the statute in regard to substantial justification should be given its plain
meaning in the absence of a contrary indication in the legislative history); Falcone
v. Commissioner, 535 F. Supp. 1313, 82-2 U.S.T.C. 9575, 50 A.F.T.R. 2d 82-5477 (E.D.
Mich. 1982) (government's case must be unreasonable in order for plaintiff to recover
fees); Spang v. Commissioner, 533 F. Supp. 220, 82-1 U.S.T.C. 19229, 49 A.F.T.R. 2d
82-1043 (N.D. Okla. 1982) (a successful recovery of fees after I.R.S. sought to retain
a penalty assessment for an alleged failure to pay corporate withholding taxes).
117. Midwest Research Institute v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1379, 1391 (W.D.
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held that the prevailing party was not entitled to recover attorney
fees incurred in resolving a dispute arising from a government breach
of contract."' The court found that the government's conduct in
litigating the issue was not reprehensible.1 9 Although usually
"reprehensible" has a more negative connotation than does
unreasonable,' the court did not explain its word choice in upholding
the substantial justification of the government's action.20
In addition to the substantial justification standard of the general
statutory exception to the American Rule contained in EAJA, the
Act also included within its language the bad faith exception to the
American Rule.' The critical distinction between the bad faith and
the general statutory exception to the American Rule provided by
EAJA was the allocation of the burden of proof. The taxpayer had
the burden of proof on the issue of bad faith. 22 If the taxpayer
established that the government acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wan-
tonly, or with oppressive behavior, the litigant became eligible for
an award of attorney fees.In
Because of the difference in burden of proof from alleging bad
faith or lack of substantial justification on the part of the govern-
ment, the overwhelming majority of cases relied on the latter
allegation." However, in at least one case the taxpayers asserted that
the government had acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for
Mo.. 1983); accord, Mary F. Kennedy v. U.S.A., 542 F. Supp. 1046, 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9290,
49 A.F.T.R. 2d 82-1327, (D.N.H., 1982).
118. Estate of Berg, 687 F.2d 377, 82-2 U.S.T.C. 13,486,50 A.F.T.R. 2d 148,
251, (U.S.Ct.Cl., 1982). In Berg, the IRS failed to redeem United States Treasury bonds
at par value when they were tendered in payment of estate taxes.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2412(c)(2) provides:
Any judgment against the United States or any agency and any official
of the United States acting in his or her official capacity for fees and
expenses of attorneys pursuant to subsection (b) shall be paid as provid-
ed in sections 2414 and 2517 of this title, except that if the basis for the
award is a finding that the United States acted in bad faith, then the
award shall be paid by any agency found to have acted in bad faith and
shall be in addition to any relief provided in the judgment.
122. Courts have imposed a "stringent standard" in cases involving an allega-
tion of bad faith and require that the persons seeking the award bear the burden
of proof. 31 ALR Fed. 833, 839-41. See infra notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
123. See generally Natural Resources Defense Council v. E.P.A., 484 F.2d 1331,
1338 (1st Cir. 1973) (a review of decisions of the Environmental Protection Agency
administrator approving portions of Rhode Island and Massachusetts air pollution
implementation plans; sanctioned award of attorney fees).
124. See e.g., supra notes 107-118 and accompanying text.
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oppressive reasons in two actions."' First, the IRS had required the
taxpayers to litigate needlessly in order to sustain a clear right.2 '
Second, the IRS had required the taxpayers to engage in duplicative
litigation.'" In a lengthy exoneration of the government's actions, the
court refused the taxpayers' application for recovery of fees.' Had
the plaintiffs sought to recover under the general statutory exception
instead of the bad faith exception, the burden of proof would have
been on the government and not on the taxpayers. Since the alloca-
tion of burden of proof can be determinative of the outcome of cases,
possibly these litigants could have recovered had they chosen the alter-
native standard.
Although EAJA was not used as extensively as anticipated" the
statute did further congressional intent. The legislature sought to
encourage review of unreasonable government action by providing an
award of attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other costs against
the United States in certain situations." As applied to tax litigants
EAJA amended the Judicial Code to provide for such awards to the
prevailing party in any civil tax action in the United States district
courts or the Court of Claims whenever the IRS acted in bad faith
or was unable to prove the substantial justification of its position.",
To tax litigants the major drawback of EAJA was the Act's
inapplicability in Tax Court.
125. United States v. Ernst & Whinney, 557 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The government's injunction against the taxpayers was dismissed for
failure to state a claim of fraudulent practices. Therefore the taxpayers asserted that
they had a clear right to recovery. The taxpayers sought to recover from the govern-
ment $26,883.56, an amount spent for the preparation of exhibits, four volumes of
photographs and documents which were submitted in opposing the government's mo-
tion for an injunction. Since the injunction action was dismissed, the taxpayer argued
that the government's action was in bad faith and that the taxpayers should be com-
pensated for the costs of the exhibits. However, the court did not find bad faith, and
the taxpayers did not recover. Id.
129. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
130. The legislative history of EAJA specifically states, "The section covers
only adversary adjudications under 554 of Title 5 and not rulemaking or other ad-
ministrative proceedings. In part, the decision to award fees only in adversary ad-
judications reflects a desire to narrow the scope of the bill in order to make its costs
acceptable." H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4992.
131. 28 U.S.C. S 451 lists the following courts: the Supreme Court of the United
States, courts of appeals, district courts, the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court, and any court created by Act of Congress
where the judges are entitled to hold office during good behavior.
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D. EAJA's Inapplicability in Tax Court
EAJA was available to litigants bringing actions in all courts
defined in 28 U.S.C. S 451.3 Therefore, EAJA applied to actions in
United States district courts and the Court of Claims, but the statute
did not apply to either state court proceedings or actions in the United
States Tax Court. While EAJA still applied to tax litigation, a tax-
payer could recover fees for expenses incurred in the litigation of any
type of federal tax liability'33 as long as the action was initiated in
an appropriate court. However, both IRS administrative proceedings
and "on the record" agency hearings, which are subject to subsequent
de novo trials in court"' were outside the scope of EAJA. Con-
sequently, EAJA's scope limited recovery to situations in which the
taxpayer had to pay the tax prior to bringing suit and excluded
recovery for some very costly yet unavoidable pre-trial procedures.
A significant judicial interpretation limiting the scope of EAJA
to Article III courts appears in McQuiston v. Commissioner.", The
taxpayers initiated this suit after they received a deficiency notice.
Although the McQuistons were able to substantiate a number of
disputed deductions, they could not reach a settlement because of a
disagreement over the proper application of income averaging ,and
net operating loss provisions.'3 After the Tax Court determined that
132. Id.
133. Although the Tax Court's jurisdiction is limited to deficiencies in income,
estate, gift, and excess profits taxes by I.R.C. SS 6212, 6213 and 7442 (West Supp.
1980), federal courts have jurisdiction for all types of federal tax liability cases. In
choosing a forum, taxpayers have tended to select the Tax Court for deficiency cases
and either the federal district courts or the Court of Claims for refund cases. L. Kern
AND D. ARGUE, TAX COURT PRACTICE 10, 25 (1970). A taxpayer who loses in Tax
Court pays not only the additional taxes but also interest; furthermore, while EAJA
still applied to tax litigation, the taxpayer could not recover attorney fees in Tax
Court no matter what the outcome was. Id. In contrast, while EAJA applied to tax
litigation, a taxpayer who selected as the forum for litigation either a district court
or the Court of Claims and who won a refund in one of those courts was guaranteed
the refund plus interest and a chance at recovering attorney fees as well. Id.
134. The definition in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (5th ed. 1979) of a de novo
trial is a situation in which the matter is tried anew, the same as if it had not been
heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered. From this definition
one may clearly reason that a prevailing party in an administrative hearing who stands
to lose that status in a subsequent trial should not recover attorney fees until the
matter is finally adjudicated.
135. 78 T.C. 807 (May 13, 1982).
136. Id.
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the taxpayers had overpaid in 1967 and had no deficiency for 1968,
the McQuistons filed an application for award of attorney fees alter-
natively under the Allen Amendment and under EAJA.'" The Tax
Court rejected the application under the Allen Amendment. In its
rejection the court first cited the deletion of the language regarding
the IRS'S which clearly indicated congressional intent that cases aris-
ing under Internal Revenue laws be covered by the provisions of
EAJA. The court then cited Key Buick, 131 which opposed an award
of fees to plaintiffs other than the government in tax litigation."'
Addressing the McQuistons' alternative argument that they be
granted attorney fees under EAJA, the court held that contrary to
the taxpayers' allegations, the Tax Court did not fall within the defini-
tion of an agency which conducts adversary adjudications."' The
McQuistons had argued that the Tax Court decision was an
administrative review of an action of the Treasury Department, which
is an agency of the United States."' McQuiston also asserted that the
Tax Court acted as the adjudicative officer of the agency." Alter-
natively, the taxpayers argued that they should recover attorney fees
under Section 204(a) of EAJA, because they were in a federal court."'
The Tax Court rejected this argument as well, holding that EAJA
applied only to courts established under Article III of the United
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Key Buick, 613 F.2d at 1306.
140. Id at 1309.
141. McQuiston, 78 T.C. at 809. See supra note 103 for statutory reference to
agency.
142. MeQuiston, 78 T.C. at 809.
143. See supra note 103. EAJA allows an agency to award to a prevailing par-
ty fees and other expenses. The Tax Court held, however, that the courts of the United
States are excluded from the definition of "agency." See also note 146 for a more detailed
explanation of the statute.
144. McQuiston. 70 T.C. at 810-811. Equal Access to Justice Act 204. 28 U.S.C.
S 2412(a) provides in part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs,
as enumerated in section 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and
expenses of attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in any
civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency and
any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in
any court having jurisdiction of such action.
The taxpayer argued that the last phrase of this passage qualified them as be-
ing in an appropriate forum for an award.
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States Constitution.'45 The Tax Court is an Article I court.'", As prece-
dent the Tax Court cited its decision in Sharon v. Commissioner, 1 7
in which it had held that the Tax Court was consciously excluded
from EAJA.'48 The Tax Court stated explicitly that nothing in EAJA
changed the results in Sharon."9 Finally, the court in McQuiston
pointed to congressional recognition that the Tax Court had no
authority to award fees and costs's and to the many unsuccessful
attempts to draft appropriate legislation to fill the void.'
Even though the Tax Court explicitly and thoroughly explained
its holding in McQuiston, at least one taxpayer subsequently attempted
to recover attorney fees after prevailing in Tax Court.'" This attempt
145. 5 U.S.C. S 551(1}(B) (1981) excludes courts of the United States from the
definition of "agency." For the purposes of 5 U.S.C. S 504(a)(1), "agency" carries the
same definition as it does in 5 U.S.C. S 551(1)(B). The U.S. Tax Court was established
as a court of the United States by section 7441 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
as amended by §951 of Pub. L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 730. Therefore, litigation before
the Tax Court does not fall within the purview of 5 U.S.C. S 504(A)(1).
146. Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I. S 8, cl. 9, which states, "to constitute
Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."
147. 66 T.C. 515 (1976).
148. 28 U.S.C. S 451 states that the term "court of the United States" includes
the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of appeals, district courts constituted
by Chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, the Customs Court, and any court created by Act of Congress the
judges of which are entitled to hold office during good behavior.
149. McQuiston, 78 T.C. at 812.
150. McQuiston, 78 T.C. at 812, n. 8.
151. The court referred to remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier, 127 CONG. REC. H.
9616 (Daily Ed. Dec. 15, 1981). Additionally the court listed eight unsuccessful legislative
attempts during 1979 alone to draft bills providing for an award of attorney fees.
From these rejected bills the court inferred that legislators could have so structured
a piece of legislation as to encompass the Tax Court if they had chosen to do so.
Perhaps other equally valid inferences could have been drawn. Thus far, research reveals
no authoritative commentary, outside the judiciary, as to whether or not the Tax Court
was purposefully excluded from coverage by EAJA. A persuasive argument that the
drafters knew precisely the effect of their words stems from the strong governmental
interest in protecting the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) so as to bring in as many
tax dollars as possible. However, an equally strong counter argument is that the drafters
of EAJA could not have intended to exclude the Tax Court since that forum in com-
bination with the IRS represent the epitome of powerful government action against
which private litigants are an unequal match. Since almost every citizen ultimately
interacts with the IRS and since relevant litigation often proceeds in the Tax Court,
to assert that legislators purposefully excluded this significant body of litigation is
not a totally credible argument. See supra note 98 for the statutory language explain-
ing the purpose of EAJA.
152. Bowen v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1087, 83-1 U.S.T.C. 9392, 52 A.F.T.R.
2d 83-5162 (11th Cir. 1983).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [1984], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/7
ATTORNEY FEES
was equally as unsuccessful as was the effort in McQuiston.'" Conse-
quently, after these judicial interpretations of EAJA, taxpayers were
again frustrated in their efforts to recover attorney fees in tax litiga-
tion. In spite of Congress' attempt to overcome the vague terminology
of the Allen Amendment, by providing specific details in EAJA,'P the
courts interpretated the statute as inapplicable to the Tax Court.
E. Additional Statutory Provisions of EAJA
Even though EAJA was construed as being inapplicable to Tax
Court, from the date of its passage until TEFRA removed all tax litiga-
tion from its authority, the many details of EAJA were relevant to
tax litigants who chose an appropriate forum. Further, these details
are still applicable to other areas of litigation and may again apply
to tax cases if Senate Bill 919 or a similar provision is enacted by
Congress.'55 The detailed provisions of EAJA include the limitations
of net worth upon fee recovery, the application procedures, the award
of fees to persons other than attorneys, and the appeal process.
First, under EAJA the litigant's net worth could determine that
individual's ability to recover fees." An individual whose net worth
exceeded a certain amount simply could not use EAJA as a vehicle
for fee recovery. The statutory limitations on net worth appeared to
be part of a larger congressional plan to equalize the powers of the
parties before the court. A wealthy individual or a large corporation
could afford the extensive legal resources necessary to offset the legal
powers of the federal government. The legislative history reflects Con-
gress' intent to equalize the treatment of the federal government and
other civil litigants by holding all parties to identical standards."?
EAJA accomplished this equalizing purpose by permitting courts the
153. The court in Bowen raised no new issues in its decision. The court repeated
the argument regarding Article III court and denied the application for fees. See supra
note 148 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 81, 92, 103, 121, 144 and accompanying text for examples
of the details in EAJA.
155. See infra notes 246 to 251 and accompanying text.
156. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4988. The two categories of litigants eligible to
recover attorney fees under EAJA were individuals whose net worth is less than
$1,000,000 and sole owners of unincorporated businesses, partnerships, corporations,
associations, or other organizations whose net worth is less than $5,000,000. Two ex-
ceptions to the net worth ceiling are certain agricultural cooperatives, [Agricultural
Marketing Act, 12 U.S.C. S 1141j(a) (1976)] and certain organizations exempt from tax-
ation, [IRC, 26 U.S.C. S 501(a) and (c)(3)]. However, no business which employs more
than 500 persons and which is involved in an administrative proceeding or civil court
action in its capacity as a business may recover attorney fees.
157. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 4987.
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discretion to award attorney fees against the federal government based
upon the same standards used to award fees against private litigants.
Second, EAJA specified the particular application procedures for
a prevailing party to recover an award. Here, as in the allocation of
burden of proof, differences existed between the bad faith standard
and the general statutory exception to the American Rule."5 9 Under
the standard where the prevailing party showed bad faith, the agency
against whom the court granted the award paid the award in addi-
tion to any relief provided in the judgment. 6' The statute provided
only that the court could award to the prevailing party reasonable
fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to costs.'6' Nowhere in
this section of EAJA were those terms defined. If the taxpayer
attempted to collect an award under the general statutory exception,
EAJA made specific provisions regarding the award. 62 The taxpayer
plaintiff had to allege that the position of the United States was not
substantially justified. 6' Within thirty days of final judgment in the
action, the taxpayer then had to submit to the court an application
for fees and expenses which showed that the party prevailed and was
thus eligible to receive an award.'64 The taxpayer also had to specify
the amount sought complete with an itemized statement, from either
the attorney or the expert witness, which listed the actual time spent
and the rate at which fees or expenses were computed.'
Third, definitions specifically delineated a reasonable standard
for the payment of expert witnesses, with the stipulation that no such
witness could be compensated at a rate which exceeded the highest
158. Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable
fees and expenses of attorneys in addition to the costs which may be
awarded in subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought
by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United
States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdic-
tion of such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and ex-
penses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the
common law or under the terms of any statute which speciically provides
for such an award.
8 U.S.C. S 2412(b) (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
159. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2412(c)(1) and (2) (Supp. 1983)
contain the award provision for the bad faith standard.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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rate paid by the United States."6 EAJA also provided for an award
for costs of any "study, analysis, test, or project found by the court
to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case.""' The statute
additionally stated that reasonable attorney fees were limited to $75.00
per hour unless the court found that an increase in the cost of living
or special circumstances justified a higher fee.'"
Fourth, EAJA provided guidelines for both the appeal processes
for litigants seeking an award of costs and fees."9 In order to ensure
uniform application procedures, EAJA required that each agency
establish uniform procedures for the submission and consideration of
applications for an award of fees and other expenses.' The statute
further provided that the adjudicative officer could reduce the amount
to be awarded, or even deny an award, if, during the course of the
proceedings, the applicant "unreasonably protracted the final resolu-
tion of the matter in controversy."'' Additionally, the statute required
that the decision of the adjudicative officer be made a part of the
record containing the final decision of the agency and also required
written findings and conclusions as well as the reasons and bases for
those results.1"
During the time when EAJA applied to tax cases, a tax litigant
who was dissatisfied with the fee determination made according to
the specifications of the Act could petition for leave to appeal to the
court of the United States having jurisdiction to review the merits
of the underlying decisions of the agency adversary adjudication.'
However, if the court denied the applicant's petition, no appeal could
then be taken from the denial.7" Conversely, if the court granted the
litigant's petition, the court could modify the determination of the
award only if it found that the failure to grant an award or the calcula-
tion of the amount of the award was an abuse of discretion.'" The
various details of EAJA reflect the care the drafters took to avoid
the judicial interpretations which ultimately led to the demise of the
Allen Amendment. That certain facets of EAJA were not perfectly
166. Equal Access to Justice Act, S 204(a), 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1983).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Equal Access to Justice Act, S 203(a)(1), 5 U.S.C. S 504(c)(2)(a) (Supp. 1983).
170. Equal Access to Justice Act, S 203(a)(1), 5 U.S.C. S 504(c)(1) (Supp. 1983).
171. Equal Access to Justice Act, S 204, 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d){1)(c) (Supp. 1983).
172. Equal Access to Justice Act, S 203(a)(1), 5 U.S.C. S 504(a)(3) (Supp. 1983).
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suited to the recovery of attorney fees in tax litigation is indicated
by subsequent legislation changes which appear in TEFRA. 1'76
IV. THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982
A. Introduction
For sixteen months tax litigants recovered fees and costs accord-
ing to the general statutory exception to the American Rule provided
by EAJA. However, on March 1, 1983, TEFRA became effective,
making it clear that Section 7430 of new Internal Revenue Code now
supersedes EAJA in regard to tax litigation.'" Therefore, prior to
the repeal date set by the sunset provision of the attorney fee sec-
tions of both EAJA and TEFRA, tax litigants are bound by TEFRA
recovery standards.1 7
B. The Concept of Prevailing Party under TEFRA
As is true under the general litigation costs award provision of
EAJA .9 the taxpayer must be the prevailing party in order to
recover fees under TEFRA.1" The difference between the two statutes
is that TEFRA specifically defines the phrase "prevailing party" as
a party other than the United States or a creditor of the taxpayer
who establishes that the position of the government is unreasonable
and who substantially prevails in court with respect to the amount
in controversy or with respect to the most significant issue or set
of issues presented in the case.18 The determination of who is the
176. See infra notes 177 to 199 and accompanying text.
177. 26 U.S.C. S 7430(a)(1) and (2) (Supp. 1983) provide:
(a) In General-In the case of any proceeding which is-
(1) brought by or against the United States in connection with the deter-
minations, collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty under this
title, and
(2) brought in a court of the United States (including the Tax Court), the
prevailing party may be awarded a judgment for reasonable litigation costs
incurred in such proceeding.
178. TEFRA is effective until December 31, 1985. The brief life of provisions
for attorney fees awards may have been purposeful so that Congress might review
their effects and operations.
179. See suproa notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
180. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
181. 26 U.S.C. S 7430(c)(A)(ii)(iii) (Supp. 1983) provides:
(A) In General-The term "prevailing party" means any party to any pro-
ceeding described in subsection (a) (other than the United States or any
creditor of the taxpayer involved) which-
(i) establishes that the position of the United States in the
civil proceeding was unreasonable, and
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prevailing party may be made either by the court or by an agree-
ment of the parties.'" The legislative history of the Act does not
facilitate judicial determination of the prevailing party because it does
not clarify the relative importance of the amount in controversy or
the significance of issues. Since TEFRA does define the term "prevail-
ing party,"'" presumably a court must rely on the statutory defini-
tion and not on law that had previously developed.'"
C. Allocation of Burden of Proof under TEFRA
In addition to the differences in the Acts' stipulations regarding
"prevailing party," another significant distinction between EAJA and
TEFRA is that TEFRA clearly places the burden on the taxpayer
to prove qualification for an award of attorney fees.' 5 The taxpayer
must bear the burden of showing that the IRS position is unreasonable.
Committee reports indicate the criteria of reasonableness Congress
envisioned.'" In determining reasonableness, a court should consider
whether the government used costs and expenses of litigation to
extract from the taxpayer concessions which were not justified under
the circumstances of the case." A court should also determine whether
the IRS pursued litigation out of any political motivation or from an
intent to harass or embarrass the taxpayer.' The committee report
(ii)(I) has substantially prevailed with respect to the amount
in controversy, or
(II) has substantially prevailed with respect to the most signifi-
cant issue or set of issues presented.
(B) Determination As To Prevailing Party - Any determination under sub-
paragraph (A) as to whether a party is a prevailing party shall be made -(i by the court, or
(ii) by agreement of the parties.
182. Id. at (BM(i) and (ii).
183. The term "prevailing party" means any party to any proceeding which
is brought by or against the United States in connection with the determination, col-
lection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty (other than the United States or
any creditor of the taxpayer involved) which established that the position of the United
States in the civil proceeding was unreasonable and which has substantially prevailed
with respect to the most significant issue or set of issues presented. 26 U.S.C. S
7430(a){2)(A)(i), 7430(c)(2)(A(i)(I)(II) (Supp. 1983).
184. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
185. 26 U.S.C. S 7430(c}(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1983) states that the taxpayer has to
establish that the government's position is an unreasonable one.
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indicates that the court must also determine other relevant factors'89
in considering the reasonableness of the government's action. However,
litigation to resolve conflict among the various circuits is not generally
considered unreasonable 9' according to the legislative history of
TEFRA. Unreasonableness must always be examined from the IRS's
position during litigation;.9 a majority of courts have adopted this
position under EAJA as well. 92
D. TEFRA's Applicability in the Tax Court
In addition to the difference in allocation of burden of proof, a
second important distinction between TEFRA and EAJA is that
TEFRA applies to the United States Tax Court as well as to United
States district courts, the United States Claims Court, and Bankruptcy
Courts.' In these courts, TEFRA covers refund litigation, general
litigation cases involving summons enforcement and collection suits""
penalty refund suits 9' jeopardy assessment proceedings" 6 and
189. Id. The Committee does not enumerate the other factors which courts
should consider. Presumably, theymight include such things as duplicative actions
and refusal to tender refunds admittedly owed to the taxpayer.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. In holding that the IRS position in pre-trial procedures must also be
reasonable, the court made Contantino an unusual exception. See supra notes 112-113
and accompanying text.
193. 26 U.S.C. S 7430(a)(2) (Supp. 1983) specifically states that the section is
applicable to any civil proceeding, "brought in a court of the United States (including
the Tax Court)."
194. The source of authority for summons and collection suits is described as
follows:
The Commissioner, or any employee of the IRS whom he designates, has
authority to issue summonses requiring production of books and records
or testimony under oath by the taxpayer or others having knowledge of
matters affecting his tax liability. This authority is derived by delegation
from the Secretary of the Treasury, 25 FED. TAX COORDINATOR 2d (RIA)
V-3250.
195. Conflict among the circuits arose under EAJA in regard to refund suits,
which are initiated in the district courts or the Court of Claims by the taxpayer rather
than the government. Courts in California, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Tennessee held
that there could be no recovery of attorney fees in refund suits under EAJA. 25 FED.
TAX COORDINATOR 2d, (RIA) V-1201. TEFRA resolved this conflict because the Act is
applicable to all tax litigation. See supma note 177.
196. A jeopardy assessm-3nt suit is a drastic measure usually reserved for cases
investigated by special agents covering racketeers and gamblers. However, a jeopardy
assessment may also be used in audits of taxpayers who are subject to large damage
suits or who have a record of past delinquency in tax payments involving potential
criminal prosecution. A jeopardy assessment is an exception to the rule requiring notice
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declaratory judgment actions involving revocation of a determination
that an organization is tax-exempt. " ' However, expenses incurred in
audit proceedings and appeals conferences are not recoverable.'"
Generally, TEFRA applies to all proceedings "in connection with the
determination, collection, or refund of any tax.""
E. Other Statutory Provisions of TEFRA
In contrast to EAJA, TEFRA imposes neither a financial
eligibility requirement nor an employee limitation as a recovery
standard. 0 Significantly, though, TEFRA requires that the taxpayer
exhaust administrative remedies as a prerequisite to recovering
attorney fees."0 ' Congress recognized the ever-increasing case load in
the Tax Court as well as the importance of the administrative appeals
before assessment of a deficiency; the exception applied only when an IRS District
Director believes that a delay will jeopardize assessing or collecting a deficiency. E.
GOODRICH. L. REDMAN. & J. QUIGGLE. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
217-18 (1965).
197. I.R.C. S 501(c)(3) (1983). Although 26 U.S.C. S 7430 generally excludes
declaratory judgments, it does provide for one exception:
(4) Exclusion of Declaratory Judgment Proceedings -
(A) In General -No award for reasonable litigation costs may
be made under subsection (a) with respect to any declaratory
judgment proceeding.
(B) Exception For Section 501(c)(3) Determination Revocation
Proceedings- Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any pro-
ceeding which involves the revocation of a determination that
the organization is described in section 501(c)(3).
198. The IRS recognizes three types of audit, none of which is a court pro-
ceeding. The first type is an office audit conducted by correspondence between the
service center or local IRS office and the taxpayer. The second type is an office audit
conducted in person at the local IRS office. The third type is a field audit conducted
usually at the taxpayer's place of business.
In those instances in which the taxpayer and examiner fail to settle a field audit
case, the examiner prepares a full report for review by the district office staff. Subse-
quently, the taxpayer receives what the IRS calls a thirty-day letter, advising him
that among other alternatives he may request an appeals conference by applying to
the District Director. The taxpayer may also have to file a written protest with the
District Director, who forwards all pertinent materials to the appellate division, from
whom the taxpayer learns the time and place of the conference 24 FED. TAX COOR-
DINATOR 2d (RIA) JT-Ill5 and T-1601.
199. 26 U.S.C. S 7430 (Supp. 1983). See supra note 177.
200. See supra notes 157-159, regarding recovery standards under EAJA. No
similar language appears in TEFRA.
201. I.R.C., 26 U.S.C. S 7430(b)(2) (Supp. 1983) states:
Requirement That Administrative Remedies Be Exhausted -A judgment
for reasonable litigation costs shall not be awarded under subsection (a)
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process in the disposition of cases.- 2 Therefore, because Congress did
not wish to encourage taxpayers to forego the administrative process
in hope of recovering litigation expenses, the legislators added the
requirement regarding administrative remedies. 3
Also, in contrast to EAJA which contained no maximum dollar
amount which the court could award, TEFRA specifies that the amount
of reasonable litigation costs which the court can award shall not
exceed $25,000.' In further limiting the award of fees, TEFRA notes
that multiple actions which could have been joined or consolidated
or joint returns which could have been joined in one action are sub-
ject to only one award."5 However, the Tax Court may award fees
to an individual who is not an attorney as long as that person is
authorized to practice before the Court.2
unless the court determines that the prevailing party has exhausted the
administrative remedies available to such party within the Internal
Revenue Services.
202. H.R. REP. No. 97-4961, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983) (hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 97-4961.)
203. Id. This provision can have the opposite of its intended effect, however,
if taxpayers resist settlement during administrative hearings in the hope of recover-
ing attorney fees in subsequent litigation.
204. 26 U.S.C. S 7430(b)(1) (Supp. 1983) states:
(b Limitations-
(1) Maximum Dollar Amount-The amount of reasonable litiga-
tion costs which may be awarded under subsection (a) with
respect to any-prevailing party in any civil proceeding shall
not exceed $25,000.
205. 26 U.S.C. S 7430(d)(1)(2) (Supp. 1983) provides:
(d) Multiple Actions-For purposes of this section, in the case-
(1) multiple actions which could have been joined or consolidated, or
(2) a case or cases involving a return or returns of the same taxpayer
(including joint returns of married individuals) which could have been joined
in a single proceeding in the same court, such actions or cases shall be
treated as one civil proceeding regardless of whether such joinder or con-
solidation actually occurs, unless the court in which such action is brought
determines, in its discretion, that it would be inappropriate to treat such
actions or cases as joined or consolidated for purposes of this section.
206. Any individual, whether plaintiff or defendant, may represent himself in
any court. When a taxpayer knowingly and voluntarily exercises his right to appear
pro se in the Tax Court, the court has no duty to insist that he be represented by
counsel.
Attorneys are admitted to practice before the Tax Court without examination
upon submitting a completed application and a clerk's certificate showing that they
are members in good standing of the highest court of any state, territory, or the District
of Columbia or of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Applicants other than attorneys are required to pass an examination given by
the court. 24 FED. TAX COORDINATOR 2d (RIA) U-1301 and U-1303.
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Reasonable litigation costs are specifically defined in TEFRA.217
Costs include reasonable court costs and the reasonable expenses of
expert witnesses in connection with the civil proceeding."8 The court
may also award reasonable costs for studies, analyses, engineering
reports, and test projects determined by the Court as necessary for
the preparation of the taxpayer's case. 9
Unlike EAJA, TEFRA sets no hourly limit on the amount of
attorney fees which a litigant may recover. 10 Neither does the statute
specifically require an itemized account of the hours worked and ser-
vices performed by the attorney. Since the statute contains no such
limitations, reasonable attorney fees may be different for each at-
torney. A senior partner can be compensated at a higher rate than
would a young associate, and different types of services may have
different dollar values."' Case law suggests different standards, such
207. 26 U.S.C. S 7430(c}(1)(A)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1983) discusses reasonable litigation
costs as follows:
(c) Definitions-For purposes of this section-
(1) Reasonable Litigation Costs-
(a) In General-The term "reasonable litigation costs" includes-
(i) reasonable court costs,
(ii) the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses in connection with
the civil proceeding,
(iii) the reasonable costs of any study, analysis, engineering report,
test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the prepara-
tion of the party's case, and
(iv) reasonable fees paid or incurred for the services of attorneys
in connection with the civil proceeding.
(B) Attorney's Fees-In the case of any proceeding in the Tax Court,
fees for the services of an individual (whether or not an attorney) who
is authorized to practice before the Tax Court shall be treated as fees
for the services of an attorney.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. TEFRA establishes a maximum recovery of $25,000 but sets no hourly
maximum. Although the Act does not mention hourly fees of tax attorneys, off-the-
record interviews with tax attorneys consistently reveal that pervailing rates are well
in excess of the $75 hourly limit set by EAJA.
211. Although "minimum" or "suggested" fee schedules which list customary
fees for different legal services have come under attack by the Justice Department
as violations of antitrust laws, see infra note 212 and Fee Schedules on the Way Out,
59 A.B.A.J. 1435 (1973), and are no longer published, off-the-record interviews with
tax attorneys and consultants indicated that a well-qualified tax attorney's services
are billed at $150.00 per hour. Assuming that these off-the-record figures are accurate,
it is reasonable to deduce that Congress recognized the problems inherent in limiting
the recovery of attorney fees in tax litigation to $75.00 per hour (as is true for EA-
JA)L omitted an hourly limit, and imposed instead a maximum total limit.
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as the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility21 or the "Lodestar"
approach.21 That the courts will carefully monitor not only the gran-
ting of awards but also the amounts of awards applied for is apparent
in an analysis of data available in regard to EAJA.211 Comparable data
for TEFRA have not yet been published as the Act has been in ef-
fect only since March 1983."5
A final provision of TEFRA specifies the appeal procedure.
TEFRA makes clear that an order which either denies or grants an
award for reasonable litigation costs shall be incorporated as a part
of the decision or judgment and shall be subject to appeal in the same
manner as would the decision or judgment itself."' A decision rendered
in the Tax Court may be reviewed by the appropriate United States
Court of Appeals"' by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
Tax Court within ninety days after the decision is entered.
212. In Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19, the court alludes to the American Bar
Association recommendation that the state and local bar associations withdraw or cancel
schedules of fees. The court in Johnson then recommends several guidelines for use
in determining an appropriate fee. The areas which the court suggested for considera-
tion include: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion
of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary
fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" of the
case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and
(12) awards in similar cases.
213. In Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891-902, (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court
noted that a fee-setting inquiry begins with the Lodestar, the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. In exploring problems
in calculating the Lodestar, the court discussed accurate documentation of hours worked,
prevailing community standards for fees, the contingent nature of success in the lawsuit,
and the quality of representation.
214. See infra note 259.
215. Telephone interview with Stanley Young, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (October 21, 1983).
216. 26 U.S.C. S 7430 (Supp. 1983) states:
(e) Right Of Appeal-An order granting or denying an award for reasonable
litigation costs under subsection (a), in whole or in part, shall be incor-
porated as a part of the decision or judgment in the case and shall be
subject to appeal in the same manner as the decision or judgment.
217. The jurisdiction to review Tax Court decisions parallels the power of the
circuit court in reviewing district court actions tried without a jury. 26 U.S.C. S 7482(a)
(1976) provides that judgment of any such court shall be final except that it shall be
subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari in the
manner provided in 28 U.S.C. S 1254 (1976).
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In regard to penalties for delay, TEFRA increases the amount
which can be awarded to the United States from $500 to $5,000 and
changed the words "merely for delay" to "primarily for delay."2 ' An
award of damages of up to $5,000 may also be made if the court deter-
mines that the taxpayer's position is frivolous or groundless. 19
The legislative history of TEFRA reflects congressional
awareness of and concern for both efficient tax administration and
the backlog of cases pending before the Tax Court.m The House Ways
and Means Committee expressed concern that any award of litigation
costs might reduce a taxpayer's incentive to settle and increase his
proclivity toward litigation." The increase in damages which could
be awarded for delay was thus coupled with the provision for awards
of costs.'
While taxpayers have not recovered attorney fees under TEFRA,
courts have used the penalty provision of the statute to grant awards
to the government.' A number of courts have imposed a penalty when
218. 26 U.S.C. S 6673 (Supp. 1983). TEFRA language provides:
(b) -Penalty For Using Tax Court Proceedings For Delay; Penalty For
Frivolous Or Groundless Proceeding-The first sentence of section 6673
(relating to damages assessable by instituting proceedings before the Tax
Court merely for delay) is amended to read as follows: "Whenever it ap-
pears to the Tax Court that proceedings before it have been instituted
or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or that the taxpayer's
position in such proceeding is frivolous or groundless, damages in an
amount not in excess of $5,000 shall be awarded to the United States
by the Tax Court in its decision."
219. FED. R. APP. P. 38 states that the courts of appeal may award "just damages
and single or double costs to the appellee" if the court determines the appeal frivolous.
220. The committee was concerned with the ever-increasing caseload of the Tax
Court and the impact that TEFRA would have on that caseload. Thus, the committee decid-
ed to limit the awarding of litigation costs to only those cases in which the government
had acted unreasonably. Legislators believed that their action would reduce the incen-
tive to avoid settlement and instead to pursue litigation in the hope of winning an award
of litigation costs. In addition the committee decided to increase the damages or penalty
that may be assessed against a taxpayer when proceedings are instituted for delay, and
to expand the cirumstances under which the Tax Court may assess those damages. Because
of the committee's concern for efficient tax administration and the backlog of cases pen-
ding before the U.S. Tax Court, the bill provided for a termination of the litigation costs
provisions for cases filed after September 30, 1984, so that the Congress could review
the operation and effect of the provision. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, H.R. REP. No.
97-404, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in PRENTICE HALL, HANDBOOK ON TAX EQUITY AND
FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 798 (1982)(hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 97-404).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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the statutory grounds were met."" These courts have held that the
cases were patently frivolous' groundless' and brought for purposes
of delay.' In a recently decided case, the court referred specifically to
the increasing caseload of the Tax Court in its decision to impose
damages on the taxpayer.' While these cases illustrate the legitimate
need to discourage frivolous suits, they also reflect a certain irony.
TEFRA, theoretically enacted to provide a vehicle by which tax
litigants could recover fees, has in reality been used to impose
penalties.
F. Unsuccessful Attempts to Recover Fees under TEFRA
A review of cases involving the recovery of attorney fees dur-
ing the first six months of TEFRA's existence indicates the difficulty
the taxpayer faces under TEFRA's allocation of the burden of proof.
Since TEFRA's enactment, no taxpayer has recovered attorney fees.
In three cases, litigants in Tax Court attempted to recover under
TEFRA, but in each case the suit was initiated before March 1, 1983,
and therefore not incorporated under the aegis of TEFRA.' In
deciding these three cases 30 the Tax Court predictably relied on
McQuiston' in holding that the Tax Court had no jurisdiction and
no statutory authority to award attorney fees. Equally predictably,
in two cases the court was silent as to what its decision might have
been given the upcoming statutory authority under TEFRA.
In contrast, the Tax Court in the third case' after referring
to lack of jurisdiction 4 took a strong stance in declaring that the cir-
224. Doyle v. Commissioner, 45 CCH T.C. Memo 410, December 27,1982, and Beer
v. Commissioner, 45 CCH T.C. Memo 401, December 27, 1982.
225. Brownie v. United States, 83-1 U.S.T.C. 9334,51 A.F.T.R.2d 83-1088 (E.D.N.Y.,
March 29, 1983). The government sought corporate records in connection with the peti-
tioner's tax liabilities for 1978-80. The petitioner alleged that the Tax Court had the jurisdic-
tion to quash the summons under 26 U.S.C. S 7609, as amended by TEFRA.
226. Graf v. Commissioner, 46 CCH T.C. Memo 450, June 13, 1983.
227. Id.
228. Vickers v. Commissioner, 46 CCH T.C. Memo 833, July 25, 1983.
229. The effective date of TEFRA was March 1, 1983.
230. Crock v. Commissioner, 46 CCH T.C. Memo 464, June 15, 1983, Hill v. Com-
missioner, 45 CCH T.C. Memo 821, February 23, 1983, and Benson v. Commissioner, 45
CCH T.C. Memo 672, February 2, 1983.
231. See supra notes 135-152 and accompanying text.
232. Crock, T.C. Memo at 464 and Hill, T.C. Memo at 821.
233. Benson, T.C. Memo at 672.
234. The court cited McQuiston, 78 T.C. at 807, to show that EAJA would not pro-
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cumstances described by the petitioner were not sufficiently egregious
as to require detail or discussion.' 5 Without saying that the facts of
the case would not merit an award of fees under TEFRA, the court
in Benson v. Commissioner 6 followed its declaration that the cir-
cumstances were not egregious by commenting that litigation com-
menced after February 28, 1983, would be governed by TEFRA." 7
The court clearly condoned the IRS pursuit of a taxpayer for a small
amount of money, which the IRS ultimately admitted the taxpayer
did not owe.' This government action required the taxpayer to engage
counsel in preparation for a trial, which the IRS wished to abandon
once it determined its error."' The triple irony is that the taxpayer
had no recourse in Tax Court before March 1, 1983, that the taxpayer
was deprived of his overpayment, and that the Tax Court determin-
ed that the IRS actions were not egregious. Even though a backlog
of cases admittedly exists in the Tax Court"'4 and the resolution of
conflicts in administrative proceedings can potentially reduce the load
of the Tax Court2"' the Benson case points directly to the heart of
the concern: the tax litigant is at a distinct disadvantage in dealing
with the IRS. Even if the taxpayer is clearly right and even if the
amount at stake is small, the taxpayer must engage counsel at his
own expense in order to defend his rights. Ultimately, recovery of
vide for recovery of attorney fees in Tax Court. Benson. T.C. Memo at 673.
235. Id. When the matter came to trial, the IRS conceded not only that no defi-
ciency was due from Benson but also that Benson had made an overpayment of $174. Prior
to trial Benson had refused to execute the decision document tendered by the IRS and
had demanded his day in court in order to complain of alleged misconduct and to demand
attorney fees and costs. Benson alleged that the IRS relied on hearsay supplied by the
Social Security Administration in lieu of conducting its own review.
236. 45 CCH, T.C. Memo 672, February 2. 1983.
237. Id- The juxtaposition of the two comments may have been coincidental, or
the Tax Court may have foreshadowed its future holdings. The second possibility has
credibility since the decision came only three weeks before TEFRA taopk effect.
238. Benson asserted that he should be reimbursed $1,000 and further stated that
the tendered concession of overpayment after the matter was set for trial was an induce-
ment to him to forego bringing to the attention of authorities his allegations of official
misconduct and personal mistreatment on the part of various IRS agents. The court found
that the conceded overpayment was offered as a means of avoiding unnecessary time ex-
penditure both of counsel and of the Court. Further, since Benson refused the tender and
because a determination of overpayment cannot be based independently on any other
evidence on the record, the Court declined to find an overpayment. Id.
239. Id T.C. Memo at 672.
240. H.R. REP. No. 97-4961.
241. Id.
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those expenses may often be impossible. The allocation to the tax-
payer to bear the burden of proving that the government's position
was not substantially justified is likely to determine the outcome of
the case."' Thus litigants using TEFRA to recover attorney fees are
less likely to succeed than those litigants who used EAJA primarily
because TEFRA allocates the burden of proof to the taxpayer, whereas
EAJA placed the burden on the government. 24 3
The legislative history of TEFRA does not elaborate on Con-
gress' primary purpose in separating tax cases from other litigation
in which an award of attorney fees is allowed. " ' So many variables
exist that any speculative effort is barely more accurate than a ran-
dom guess."'4 Because any legislation which affects income taxes is
a volatile issue in an election year, perhaps more insight about TEFRA
may be derived from an examination of the legislation written to
replace the expiring statute than from the legislative history of the
Act itself.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING SENATE BILL 919
Possibly because of the difficulty which taxpayers have had in
recovering fees under TEFRA and certainly because the sunset pro-
visions of both EAJA and TEFRA cause the costs and fees sections
242. M. GREE.N, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 93 (1972). Pragmatically it is easier to pro-
ve a positive fact than a negative one. It is easier for the government to prove the substan-
tial justification of its action than it is for the taxpayer to establish the lack of substantial
justification.
243. "The Taxing Act does not require the taxpayer to be an incorrigible optimist."
declared the court in allowing a taxpayer to deduct as losses his stock in a German sub-
sidiary when the German government took over the assets in 1918. United States v. S.S.
White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398,402 (1927). TEFRA does appear to require incorrigi-
ble optimists. Clearly, in conflict are the long-standing tradition that the taxpayer must
bear the burden of proof in all challenges against the IRS and the more recent legislative
purpose of equalizing the disproportionate power of the government when a private citizen
wishes to vindicate a clear right. TEFRA represents the tradition; EAJA represents the
more recent congressional purpose.
244. H.R. REP. No. 97-404.
245. The drafters may have been influenced by their knowledge of the judicial
interpretations of both the Allen Amendment and EAJA and may have wished to write
a statute which clearly specified that tax litigants could seek an award of fees in Tax Court.
Alternatively, legislators may have recognized that tax litigants could not possibly recover
their expenses under the maximum hourly award of EAJA and my have preferred to adopt
a separate statute rather than making an exception to EAJA. Another possibility is that
Congress intended to insulate the IRS from challenges by taxpayers and, therefore, pur-
posefully allocated the burden of proof onto the litigant. This motivation could explain
why the statute facially establishes a vehicle for the recovery fees, an appropriate gesture
[Vol. 19
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to expire, legislators are currently considering Senate Bill 919.24' This
proposed legislation would permanently extend EAJA. Senate Bill 919
would also expand EAJA's coverage and bring tax cases back within
its scope."7 While the bill is replete with technical language and con-
forming amendments, nowhere does it state a legislative purpose. Sim-
ple statements of the plain meaning are essential if this legislation
is to avoid the latent ambiguities of its predecessors.
The fatal flaw of previous fee recovery legislation was the judicial
interpretation of the Acts as inapplicable to tax litigants. 28 TEFRA
provided the specific language necessary to assure applicability to tax
litigants but also allocated the burden of proof to the taxpayer."' This
allocation is responsible for the current situation which frustrates tax-
payers: technically, the opportunity for fee recovery exists, but, prac-
tically, litigants cannot successfully prove the unreasonableness of the
government's action. - Taxpayers' lack of success may be due either
to the allocation of the burden or to a general unwillingness of courts
to find that the IRS acted in an unreasonable manner. Unless its
language is altered, the legislation now before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary" may do little to improve taxpayers' opportunities
to recover attorney fees and to equalize treatment to all litigants who
seek an award of attorney fees against the government.
As- currently written, Senate Bill 919 is a mere exercise in seman-
tics. The legislation proposes to amend EAJA by striking various
detailed provisions from the Act. 2 However, the drafters of the bill
fail to include an explanation of their purpose in proposing these
amendments. In addition to amending EAJA, Senate Bill 919 would
repeal portions of three sections of EAJA. Both the purposes and
intended effects of these proposed changes need clarification.
for a statute with the word "equity" in the title, and subtly sets the standard so high
that no one can collect, an action more in line with a conservative definition of "fiscal
responsibility," other critical words in the statute's name.
246. S. 919. 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
247. Id-
248. In Key Buick the court found that the Allen Amendment could no longer be
used to recover fees in tax litigation. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 185-192 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 229-243 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 246.
252. S. 919, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) proposes to amend a net worth provision
codified at 5 U.S.C. S 504 (Supp. 1983), references to agency awards codified in the same
section, and a provision regarding agency officials codified at 28 U.S.C. S 2412 (Supp. 1983).
253. S. 919, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) call for the repeal of Sections 203(c), 204(c),
and 207 of EAJA.
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One commentator has suggested that the effect of the repeal of
these three sections is to bring the Tax Court back within the scope
of EAJA.1 However, although Senate Bill 919 proposes to repeal
subsection (c) of section 204 of EAJA, it was subsection (a) of section
204 to which the court in McQuiston referred in the pivotal decision
which removed the Tax Court from the scope of EAJA.m To preclude
future judicial reliance on McQuiston, Senate Bill 919 must also repeal
section 204(a) of EAJA. Moreover, the bill must specify that its pur-
pose in repealing section 204(a) is to allow the recovery of attorney
fees in Tax Court. Revising Senate Bill 919 in this manner would en-
sure EAJA's applicability to Tax Court and therefore eliminate the
major obstacle to tax litigants recovering fees under the Act. However,
as long as TEFRA is effective, tax litigants still must bear the burden
of proving that the government's action was not substantially justified.
The final provision of Senate Bill 919 would repeal, in its entire-
ty, the attorney fee provision of TEFRA. While a repeal of TEFRA
would remove a major obstacle to recovery, the allocation of the
burden of proof to the taxpayer, it would also abolish the few poten-
tial benefits which TEFRA offers tax litigants. The most beneficial
aspect of TEFRA which tax litigants stand to lose under Senate Bill
919 is the provision for a maximum amount recoverable rather than
a maximum hourly rate.' However, the sacrifice of the maximum total
award effected by a repeal of TEFRA is a small price to pay to ac-
complish the reallocation of the burden of proof.
The onus of TEFRA is the allocation of this burden. The brief
history of TEFRA reveals that taxpayers have not recovered under
the Act. 51 Since the most substantial difference between TEFRA and
EAJA is the allocation of the burden of proof, a major cause of
TEFRA's ineffectiveness is arguably this allocation.M Evidence ex-
254. Litigation Focus, 30 FED. BAR NEWS & JRNL. 379, 380 (1983).
255. McQuiston, 78 T.C. Memo at 810. The decision states:
Petitioners argue in the alternative that they should be awarded costs pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. S 2412 (1981 ed.), 4 also amended by the Equal Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. 96-481, Title II, Section 204(a), 94 Stat. 2327 (effective
Oct. 1, 1981). By virtue of 28 U.S.C. S 451 (1981), 5 Section 2412 only applied
to courts established under Article III of the United States Constitution.
... For purposes of Title 28, the United States Tax Court was consciously
excluded from the definitions of a court.
256. See supra notes 204, 210 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 229-243 and accompanying text.
258. Other reasons may explain why taxpayers have failed to recover fees under
this statute. TEFRA has not been in effect long enough for a well-developed body of case
law to explain judicial interpretation of the statute's effectiveness.
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ists to prove that EAJA was an effective vehicle for the recovery
of fees."9 No case law exists which shows the recovery of attorney
fees under TEFRA. Because the burden of proof is critical, legislators
should go beyond the repeal of TEFRA; they should specifically
allocate the burden of proof to the government in all fee recovery
cases, including tax litigation, as they extend EAJA's life.
Legislation designed to equalize treatment of all litigants who
attempt to recover fees from the government would be more effec-
tive if the language were more specific. First, Senate Bill 919 should
specifically repeal §204(a) of EAJA. Second, the bill should
affirmatively state that EAJA applies to Tax Court litigation. Final-
ly, the legislation should clearly reallocate the burden of proof to the
government. These changes will enhance the possibility that the fourth
legislative attempt to bring an award of attorney fees to tax litigants
will ultimately accomplish that elusive goal.
CONCLUSION
Analyses of the legislative histories and the case law which
developed under the Allen Amendment, EAJA, and TEFRA reveal
259. The Administrative Office of the United States Court publishes the number
of and amounts of fees actually recovered under EAJA. The Congressional Budget
Office projected that during the first year under EAJA all private parties (not just
tax litigants) would win fee awards in about 3,000 court cases and 2,700 administrative
cases and, therefore, estimated a budget of $69,000,000 for 1981-82. The actual awards
disbursed have not approached the amount budgeted. Although only a relatively small
number of applicants have actually recovered fees from the IRS under EAJA, records
indicate that of all agencies covered only the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices exceeded the IRS in the number of recoveries made against it. However, since
TEFRA removed all tax litigation from the scope of EAJA on February 28, 1983,
the figures in the reports represent only the nine months of 1982 when EAJA applied
to tax cases as compared to the full year of coverage of all other agencies.
According to the Administrative Office of the United States Court, from Oc-
tober 1981 until June 1982 thirteen parties won $683,518 in fees and costs in court
cases. The Administrative Conference of the United States listed only one award of
$21,120 in administrative proceedings granted during the first year that the law was
in effect. The most recent report by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts indicates that 133 petitions for attorney fees and other expenses were filed
in federal courts under EAJA during the year which ended June 30, 1983. More than
sixty percent of the 133 requests were denied; in most cases the court determined
that the government's position was substantially justified. Three petitions were filed
in United States Claims Court for recovery of fees from the IRS; all were denied.
In United States District Courts sixteen petitions were filed for recovery of fees from
the IRS: of those sixteen petitions the courts awarded five, with a total of $82,607
actually recovered. In United States Bankruptcy Courts, one petition for recovery of
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taxpayers' difficulties in recovering fees from the IRS. The vague
language of the Allen Amendment ultimately resulted in judicial in-
terpretation which so narrowed its applicability that it was virtually
ineffective. The Allen Amendment was then repealed by EAJA, which
was superseded by TEFRA.
A brief example highlights the differences between EAJA and
TEFRA, which should be.resolved before the statutes are re-enacted.
In the early months of 1983 while EAJA still applied to tax litigants
but before TEFRA was effected, a prospective tax litigant who faced
what he considered an unreasonable or unjustified action by IRS had
a choice. The taxpayer could have paid the tax and sued for a refund
in either a United States District Court or in the United States Claims
Court. This decision meant, first, that fee recovery was limited to
$75 per hour but that no maximum limit was placed on the recovery.
Second, and much more significant, was the fact that once the tax-
payer prevailed, the government had the burden of proof to show
that its position was substantially justified. Alternatively, this same
potential litigant could have chosen to bide his time until after March
1, 1983, and, therefore, attempt to recover under TEFRA. This deci-
sion had the distinct advantage that the taxpayer did not have to
pay his tax before filing suit since he could now hope to recover fees
in Tax Court. A second advantage of TEFRA was that the taxpayer
could potentially recover fees in excess of $75 per hour, but a $25,000
maximum recovery was imposed. However, most significantly, in order
to recover, the taxpayer had to bear the burden of proving that the
government's position was not substantially justified, a burden which
has proved almost impossible to uphold.
Although this dilemma faced taxpayers for at most a few weeks
in early 1983, the simple example clearly distinguishes certain provi-
sions of EAJA and TEFRA. When Congress considers re-enactment
of attorney fee recovery statutes this year, it should first articulate
the intended purpose or benefit of the legislation to individual litigants.
If the genuine purpose is to place all citizens on an equal ground with
the government, Congress should allocate the burden of proof to the
government in all fee recovery litigation. The obvious and equitable
fees was filed against the IRS and denied. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Report by the Director on Requests
for Fees and Expenses Under the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, 182-85 (1982); and
REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON REQUESTS FOR FEES AND Ex.
PENSES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1980, JULY 1, 1982 THROUGH JUNE
30, 1983 (William E. Foley, Director, September 23, 1983).
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solution is to include both Article I and Article III courts under EA-
JA and to return to one standard of recovery for all litigants. These
goals can be accomplished with plain language regarding the purpose
and intended effect of future legislation. A clear statement of Con-
gressional intent to treat taxpayers and all other litigants equally may
also have an impact on the general hostility in courts toward fee
awards against the IRS.
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Link: Award of Attorney Feeds in Tax Litigation
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [1984], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss1/7
